


CONTROL OF CIVIL DISORDERS



GUIDELINES FOR SMALL - UNIT COMMANDERS AND TROOPS

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GUIDELINES FOR SMALL UNIT COMMANDERS AND GUARDSMEN
IN THE CONTROL OF CIVIL DISORDERS

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GUIDELINES FOR SMALL UNIT COMMANDERS AND GUARDSMEN

IN THE CONTROL OF CIVIL DISORDERS

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INTRODUCTION

The fundamentals of military operations have changed little in history. They must, however, be adapted to meet the challenges of changing times. When they are adapted they are called techniques. The recent experience of the Guard in Detroit illustrated that the nature of civil disorder in the United States - disorder that has been rare in our history - has to some extent changed. While maintaining exacting standards of training to deal with the more obvious forms of civil disorder (mob violence, wide-spread vandalism), we must also prepare ourselves to use new techniques in meeting the "new" characteristics of civil unrest (random sniping, looting and arson). This pamphlet presents new means for dealing with the complexities of situations arising from civil emergencies and the commitment of the Arizona Guard to confront them. Commanders should use imagination in training and operations, remembering that they may as easily be confronted with an angry mob as they may be by a hidden sniper.

There can be no greater test of the Guardsman's maturity, common sense, and discipline than his performance in controlling civil disorder and in restoring the peace and tranquility our government promises all citizens.

THE NATURE OF CIVIL DISORDER

No government in history has proved able to satisfy all its citizens all the time. If enough citizens are dissatisfied with their elected representatives, they can, in the United States, replace them with others at elections. But always there will remain a body of citizens who are unhappy with some aspects of their government's rule. Normally such citizens hope to correct the situation as they see it by electing new representatives. This is the democratic method required by our constitution. Sometimes groups of citizens ignore this democratic process and attempt to make their protests felt by violent means strong enough to bring public attention to them. The hope is that the government will be forced to yield to their wishes.

Sometimes the protesting group is organized; sometimes it is not. Sometimes it is very small - such as a dozen men who have been thrown out of a public park for drunkenness and who react by throwing rocks at windows. Often a small "protest" like this will attract others who wish to "join the fun". At any rate, the violent form of protest is a fact of life; and the local and State agencies of government must be prepared to deal with it.

To violence arising from some grievance, we should add violence arising, literally, from boredom or from a perverse wish to create disorder. This frequently goes hand-in-glove with the former category. Detroit is a well defined example. After mob violence had been substantially quelled, lawless elements continued sniping, random looting, and pillage. This general disorder, which may well lack organization or intelligent purpose, requires special techniques by law enforcement agencies, including State troops.

Historically, Federal troops have seldom been used to suppress domestic violence; however, units of the National Guard are frequently called upon to restore law and order. The recent experiences in Detroit and Newark underscore areas on which training emphasis needs to be placed. Despite its commitment to the containment of a form of civil disorder it had not specifically planned for, the Guard's performance was widely acknowledged to be outstanding. Hence an important conclusion: the well-trained, disciplined Guardsman is capable of dealing successfully with civil disorder if he and his leaders use sound common sense. Let it be said at the outset that the mere arrival of disciplined troops at the scene of a disturbance acts as a strong deterrent to all but the most determined law-breakers. The Guard's experience in Detroit and Newark illustrated this fact dramatically.

COOPERATION WITH CIVIL AUTHORITIES

Except when martial law has been declared (and it is only rarely declared), the Guard's operations to control civil disorders are done in support of similar operations by local and State authorities. Local agencies of government (police, fire departments, courts, boards, etc) continue to function as fully as possible; their authority for such operations remains the same as it was before the arrival of Guard troops.

Such support must be given in the spirit of friendly cooperation; the Guardsman is called on to give emergency help to professionals who have made a career of enforcing order, who know their areas and the people who live and work in them, who are familiar with local and State laws and who have had practical experience in dealing with civil disorder. On the other hand, Guard troops are never placed under command of police at any level.

To the lowest level possible, Guardsmen and police serve together in restoring order. Ideally, a policeman would accompany squad-sized elements on their patrols. In any case, the company command post (CP) must be able to make immediate contact with police in the area. If this capability exists, any problem serious enough to cause the patrol leader to call the CP for help or counsel can result in the immediate deployment of police to the scene of the difficulty.

TROOP – CIVILIAN RELATIONS

Guardsmen should remember two facts about the vast majority of civilians: First they are decent, and law-abiding, and deplore civil disorder; therefore, they will cooperate in any way with police and Guardsmen, to restore order. Second, they have a healthy respect for Guard troops.

Small-unit leaders therefore must brief their troops before deployment on troop-civilian relations, stressing the following point. Each Guardsman represents his unit and the State Government. Some civilians will see only one or two Guardsmen during their stay in their city and their impression of the Guard will be formed by their impression of these Guardsmen. Since the Guard will be under close scrutiny at all times, a fine by-product of effort to stop the disorder can be a renewed public interest and respect for the Arizona National Guard.

More important is our mission. Our guideline is the reasonable application of force consistent with our objective. Unless large elements of the Guard are committed under central control to quell mob violence, we will accomplish our objective by using small, fragmented bodies of troops.

These troops have frequent contact with friendly civilians. They must show the utmost courtesy in their dealings with them, and particularly with women and children. Guardsmen on missions must firmly discourage civilians from loitering around their posts or "tagging along" while they are on patrol.

When questioning civilians, those offering information as well as suspects, courtesy is again the keynote.

Guardsmen ignore unfriendly remarks.

No Guardsman will enter any private dwelling unless on official business.

Guardsmen who are "propositioned" decline the offer and report it immediately to their superior.

NEWS MEDIA

News media representatives will often attempt to interview Guardsmen committed to the control of civil disorder. They should be treated with courtesy and respect, but junior leaders and troops should make no comments (even if told their remarks will be "off the record") on the origins and nature of the civil disorder, or on the means, planned or actual, by which the Guard is handling the situation. The most common question asked the Guardsmen in Detroit was, "What do you think about all this?" Most Guardsmen did not rise to the bait.

Should a disorder take the form of a "race riot," Negro Guardsmen can expect to be asked leading questions about their stand on civil rights. Their standard answer to such questions should be something on the order of, "I am proud to be a Guardsman, and I follow the instruction of my superior officers."

Finally, it should be emphasized that most newspapermen have or are forming in their minds a definite point of view. Likewise, their publications will be committed to viewpoints for which interviews with troops may provide supporting material. It is easy for reporters to take remarks out of

context, and the result may be that the comments of individual Guardsmen may be rearranged or edited to alter their meaning. For instance, a Guardsman might tell a reporter, "I think this thing is a mess, but it's certainly not as bad as we'd heard and it's improving." This might appear in a paper as: "A Guardsman observed, 'This thing is a mess!'"

More specific guidance on troop-press relations should be given during operations, but the best general rule remains the use of common sense.

ORGANIZATION

The basic objective of the organization prescribed herein is to organize and train individuals in the elements in which they will be employed in an actual Civil Disturbance/Riot Control situation. Such organization must emphasize teamwork and should remain stable once it has been determined.

a. The basic organization for training and deployment in Civil Disturbance/Riot Control will be a four (4) or five (5) man team. The team will be composed of a Leader and three (3) or four (4) riflemen.

b. Within the capability of the unit concerned, teams will be organized into two (2) team squads, and squads into four (4) squad platoons. Platoon headquarters will consist of:

Platoon Leader (Officer)

Platoon Sergeant (Senior NCO)

Messenger (Radio Operator)

c. It is recognized that command, control and administrative support requirements will have to be met both in actual operations and in training. However, actual operations will require the maximum number of individuals to be available for employment in the objective area. Therefore, command, control, and administrative support personnel will be limited to approximately 10% of the unit for companies and batteries, and 20% for battalion headquarters DET/companies and headquarters batteries. Individuals designated as required for command, control, and administrative support activities will be organized into provisional squads for the conduct of training. Command and control organizations higher than battalion will organize their units into provisional squads and platoons for the conduct of training.

The deployed strength of the company/battery is rarely its assigned strength. Since the basic unit of operation in the control of civil disorder is the patrol, normally the size of a team or squad, certain adaptations may have to be made by the company commander to insure full-sized patrols. The principle of small-unit integrity is followed as closely as possible when patrols are used.

As feasible, each patrol should have assigned to it, in addition to a patrol leader and his assistant, a radio and a radio-telephone operator (RTO). The remainder are riflemen.

Platoon CPs may be co-located with the Company CP, allowing direct communication between the patrols and the company CP. Another advantage of co-location is that one of the platoon leaders can serve as action officer in the absence of the company commander. Such arrangements are, of course, subject to modification under varying circumstances.

Finally, certain other items of equipment may be added to the company's store of equipment. Among these are loud-speakers; chemical dispersers and grenades; small improvised searchlights; small hand-fire extinguishers; concertina wire, etc.

DEPLOYMENT POLICY

a. Company/battery commanders, or officer in charge of a company size force, will be equipped with a 1/4 ton truck and internal communications. The company/battery commander will locate himself with the major committed element of his command. Where possible, the company/battery commander should be accompanied by a local police officer.

b. An officer will be deployed with each force of less than platoon size, which is assigned an independent mission.

c. Personnel will not be assigned missions as individuals in objective area. Guard posts, sentry posts, road blocks, or any other mission which might conceivably be assigned to one individual will habitually be assigned to teams of two or more individuals. Security of unit bivouac areas will be accomplished using normal interior/exterior guard procedures, providing such bivouac areas are far enough removed from the objective area to permit this type of security.

d. Anti-sniper teams will be employed under supervision of an officer.

e. Local police officers should accompany any size committed force (Company, Platoon, Squad, Patrol) when possible. Such local police officers will make any actual arrests of the civil populace required. Where such police officers are not available, authority of Guard personnel to arrest civilian personnel will be included in orders at the time the mission is assigned.

THE COMPANY COMMAND POST

The company CP should be established near the sector of responsibility (SOR). Though many circumstances may dictate its location, the following characteristics are desirable:

- The CP should be easily accessible to the best road net.
- Public telephone facilities should be immediately at hand.
- A building should be selected which will provide adequate space, sanitary facilities, desks or tables, room for the mobile reserve parking space, and an area for mess facilities. Size will be dictated by whether or not off-duty troops are billeted elsewhere.

Guards are positioned at all entrances to the CP to insure that no one enters the CP without property authority. Communications are centralized in one location. Another area is set aside for the mobile reserve unit, normally of patrol size. Company vehicles, also carefully guarded, are kept immediately available.

Civilians are discouraged from loitering in the area.

No soldier moves outside the CP building without his individual weapon and full web equipment.

A regular schedule of duty officers and NCOs is posted by the first sergeant. The duty officer should be the platoon leader whose platoon is providing the on-duty patrols at that time. The duty NCO is the platoon sergeant of the same platoon. One of these two is in the CP whenever the other is out checking patrols. He is the direct link between the patrol in the streets and the company commander. The duty NCO alerts each relief at a time sufficient to allow its members to prepare to go on patrol. He also is responsible for the police and security of the CP during his shift.

Prior to occupation of an area, rights of entry must be obtained. The senior Guard Headquarters usually obtains these rights. A survey of the area should be conducted to ascertain the physical condition of facilities prior to use by Guard troops. If necessary, a unit officer will conduct such a survey.

OPERATIONS IN CONTROL OF CIVIL DISORDER

Command and Control

Units of the Arizona National Guard will normally be assigned sectors of responsibility in cities where the Guard's presence has been required. As far as possible, these sectors coincide with those regularly established by local police authorities. Acute disorder (mob violence, fire storms, etc) may require the company to move rapidly to another area; therefore, the company commander must brief his subordinates on the procedures for rapid redeployment.

The key tactical element in the restoration of order is the patrol. Whether on foot or mounted in vehicles, the patrol moves through its area of responsibility frequently and in an irregular pattern. Each unit must saturate or give the impression of saturating its area of responsibility with troops. This is done both to reassure citizens and to deter prospective lawbreakers.

The company commander controls his unit by radio and by personal contact. He and other small-unit leaders constantly check their men for alertness, relevant knowledge, and military appearance. Company officers and NCOs insure that their location is always known to company headquarters and remain in close touch with headquarters.

Show-of-Force Operations

Every military operation in control of civil disorder is in a sense a show-of-force operation. Operations are conducted to make clear to prospective lawbreakers that the unit (company, platoon, squad, etc.) means business and is fully capable of carrying out any assigned task.

These operations take many forms. During initial deployment into an area of responsibility, elements of the company move under arms. If marching at attention, their movements are executed with snap precision. Comments from bystanders are completely ignored. The impression of calm, determined professionalism is created.

Practice alerts and deployments at company level are executed with similar vigor. The mobile reserve moves as quickly as possible to the threatened area; communications checks are made; small unit leaders check their stationary posts. Although practice deployments are not normally conducted as a show-of-force, they can hardly fail to make an impression on civilians.

When the situation allows, the unit conducts regular morning physical training (PT). In Detroit, for example, PT was conducted several times in battalion strength, specifically for its show-of-force effect. Again the impression of military fitness is reemphasized.

The value of show-of-force operations cannot be overestimated. Their efficient conduct is the responsibility of junior officers and NCOs, but every Guardsman should constantly be reminded that his every act receives public scrutiny. His military professionalism is the best possible show-of-force to the population, be they law-abiding or disorderly.

Patrolling--General Considerations

A patrol operating in an area of urban civil disorder has a three-fold mission:

- It acts as a deterrent.
- It gathers information.
- It quells lawlessness and disorder.

The company commander determines the size of his patrols, taking into consideration the nature of the disorder in his sector of responsibility. He and his subordinates plan the routes of foot and mounted patrols. In no case should patrols follow a fixed route or maintain a fixed speed. Once a prospective arsonist, looter, or sniper senses a regularity to the patrol's movement, he can gauge the best time to conduct his activity, e.g., when the patrol will be farthest away from a particular target.

A reserve patrol/squad ("mobile reserve") is kept on call near the company CP with the mission of providing immediate reinforcement to any patrol that may require it. It deploys by vehicle at the maximum safe speed to the scene of the action.

Mounted Patrols

The company normally will use mounted patrols when the seriousness of the disorder is somewhat diminished. Extensive mounted patrolling will, of course, require additional vehicles from higher headquarters. Initially, a single mounted patrol should be assigned a patrol route through the entire company area of responsibility. However, the company commander should not send out a mounted patrol unless some other provision has been made for transport for his mobile reserve.

The patrol leader rides in the cab of the truck and directs the driver (with a local policeman, if assigned). He has the immediate responsibility for the performance (alertness, appearance, etc) of those riding in back. The vehicle moves at a speed which will permit good observation of danger areas. Guidance will be furnished from higher headquarters as to whether or not vehicle lights should be on or off.

Those riding in back face outboard, the assistant patrol leader assigning each man an area of surveillance. When suspicious activity is observed, a report is immediately radioed to the company CP. Concurrently, the vehicle is halted and the troops disembark to investigate, always leaving behind them two or three men to insure the safety of the vehicle and its driver. The vehicle is never parked near street-lamps or other bright lights; its lights are turned off when parked.

Substantially the same guidelines apply to smaller patrols mounted in 1/4 ton trucks. Most mounted patrolling activity during serious phases of civil disorder (when sniper fire, looting, vandalism and fires have not been suppressed) is conducted in 1/4 ton trucks, so that the larger company vehicles may be used to deploy the reserve as necessary. Five-man patrols are the norm, and include a driver, patrol leader (often an officer inspecting his sector), two riflemen and an RTO. These patrols move slowly through the streets, with their lights out. Again, alertness is the key to success. Troops do not smoke while patrolling in vehicles. If possible a local policeman should accompany all patrols for arrest purposes.

Foot Patrols

Foot patrols are the company's main activity in control of civil disorder and represent the best deterrent to crime. Depending on the deployed size of his platoons, the company commander forms from two to eight patrols from each platoon; depending on the situation, he deploys from 25% to 100% of the patrols at once. Like mounted patrols, foot patrols are assigned a route and sector of responsibility through which they move at varying intervals and in different directions.

The formation used is up to the patrol leader: He is given the mission, and he, more than anyone else, should know the requirements in his sector.

Some general guidance for patrols:

-- Patrols avoid moving under street lights and similar danger areas.

- Members keep staggered intervals between each other.
- Though courteous to civilians, they do not engage in idle conversation.
- The RTO keeps in constant touch with the platoon (or company) CP.
- Adequate security is provided to the front, flanks and rear.

In summary, mobile and foot patrols act as deterrents to prospective law-breakers, gather information, and restore order when necessary. A good patrol is an excellent deterrent to disorder -- and the success of the deterrent depends upon the professionalism of the patrol.

Conduct of Reliefs

The relief commander, normally the platoon leader whose platoon patrols are drawn, personally places his men on stationary posts and is responsible for coordination with the previous relief commander to insure that area of responsibility remains adequately covered by mobile and foot patrols during the time for changing reliefs. Stationary guards exchange all information of value with their reliefs. The same exchange is accomplished by mobile and foot patrols. Information passed along may include:

- Danger areas in the patrol's area of operation.
- Scenes of reported violations of the law.
- Areas in which curfew is frequently broken.
- Location of nearest police officers.
- Code-words and call-signs.

The relief commander personally checks his patrols at least once each hour they are on duty. He stresses the need for continued alertness, military bearing and caution in dealing with suspect civilians.

Anti-Sniper Operations

A sniper is an individual who fires a small-calibre weapon from a concealed location. Since he represents a dangerous adversary to civilians and troops alike, his immediate capture or elimination is one of the most important duties of the soldier in the streets. And it must be remembered that the apprehension of the sniper in an American city is a much different proposition from the elimination of the sniper in a combat zone. Here again, the guideline minimum necessary force consistent with accomplishment of the mission is crucial. Despite attempts to remove all innocent civilians from the area of operations, some may remain. Since our purpose is to safeguard their security, we accomplish nothing if we fire indiscriminately at suspected general areas.

In Detroit a whole brigade noted only ten sniping incidents in six days of operations. Of the five instances where troops were targets, only one soldier was slightly wounded. From these and similar facts in the experience of other units, it is clear that few snipers care to operate in areas that are saturated with well-trained troops. Further, those that do operate tend to fire inaccurately.

In short, when a sniper feels his chances of being caught are good, his activity will be minimal.

Troops operating in built-up areas must form the habit of looking for likely positions from which sniper fires may be directed at them or at civilians. On street patrols, both foot and mobile, the patrol leader must assign areas of surveillance to men in his unit. Certain men are detailed to look to the flanks, at windows, rooftops and trees on each side of the street. Others are instructed to provide rear security from sniper fire. Finally, the point men keep a close watch during movement on the likely sniper locations to their front. The squad leader makes frequent checks on his troops' alertness, and insures that, where possible, they avoid moving under street lights or other lighted areas. As in all street patrolling, he varies his route and speed of march. Troops riding in vehicles follow substantially the same guidelines: they face outboard and look constantly.

Areas which are known to have come under previous sniper fire or which represent good targets to the sniper (e.g., intersections) may be assigned stationary guards. These men make use of available cover and concealment: In no case should they be positioned on rooftops unless local police and other troops are shown their locations. Stationary guards are checked often and should not remain at their posts for more than four hours.

The following is a recommended method of eliminating or capturing a sniper: On coming under fire, the patrol takes cover immediately. No fire is returned unless the sniper's location is definitely pinpointed, in which case single, aimed shots are fired as necessary. The RTO immediately reports the sniper fire, giving approximate location, number of rounds fired, and casualties to the company CP. The company commander immediately deploys the mobile reserve to help seal-off the immediate area. Meanwhile, the squad leader, cooperating with local police, moves to block each exit to the building from which the shots were fired. He and his patrol members instruct civilians to move out of the area or to take cover. Then, after the suspected building has been "covered" by the patrol, the leader and appointed troops enter the building with local police.

After the sniper has been instructed to lay down his weapon and come out of the building, the search team, cooperating with local police, moves to the suspected room and apprehends the suspect. As far as possible, apprehension is left to local police, who are trained in such duties. For this reason, local police should be on the scene before the search is initiated. Escaping snipers are warned "Halt!" and then (1) shot to wound (aiming at legs) if armed or (2) physically restrained and searched if unarmed. If there is doubt whether the sniper is armed, the Guardsman, acting under the explicit guidance of his patrol leader or other senior officer, shoots to wound.

Looting and Vandalism

Civil disorder is characterized by looting and vandalism. Deployed patrols have among their main objectives the deterrence of both and the detention, if necessary, of those observed committing crimes and in possession of property under circumstances which indicates that it was obtained unlawfully during the period of disturbance.

An effective saturation of the company's area of responsibility with troops will do much to eliminate both problems. All places of business, especially liquor stores, department stores, and grocery stores should be checked regularly on the patrols' rounds. However, this is a police function, and should be accomplished by the local police. Also company commanders must be wary of too many "point commitments," especially when made at the specific request of business owners. These commitments tend to tie down troops whose presence may be required elsewhere.

If either vandalism or looting occurs, and looters or vandals are caught "in the act," troops either apprehend or assist the local police to apprehend individuals as necessity requires. The RTO immediately radios the company CP, giving all relevant details of the crime, and requests police assistance if none is available on the spot. Civilians not involved are requested to leave the area.

All necessary measures short of firing at looters or vandals are taken to apprehend them. Exits are blocked off and individuals are told to leave the buildings. If they remain inside, soldiers and local police then enter the building with weapons locked and loaded to detain them. All loot is turned over to local police.

Vandalism is more difficult to control than looting. It is without pattern or rational cause; moreover, vandals are rarely caught in the act. All acts of vandalism are reported to the Company CP and local police forces; also, areas which have proved particularly susceptible to vandalism are carefully watched. Persons observed in the act of vandalism are detained in the same manner as looters.

Troop-Baiting

Soldiers can expect a certain amount of criticism from local civilians. Most of it is good-natured or well-intended. Some of it is not. Guardsmen marching in formations are especially liable to be jeered by unfriendly civilians. The comments and jeering must be ignored. Getting a "rise" out of an individual Guardsman only encourages the "troop-baiter."

Often the jeering is directed at an individual soldier with distinguishing weapons or equipment, or those with distinguishing features. Both the individual and his fellow Guardsmen ignore the jeering.

If the disturbance has racial overtones, Negro Guardsmen may be singled out by troop-baiters. Their discipline in the face of such activity is crucial. They should not betray their feelings in any way. Equally to be avoided is the attempt of the well-meaning soldier to "stick up" for any one of his friends who is singled out by the crowd.

Some forms of troop-baiting are more serious. Among these are the throwing of rocks, bottles, garbage, etc. at troops, and the distribution of propaganda pamphlets among them by "activist" groups. With regard to the former: troops in formation continue to move through the area from which debris is thrown at them unless, in the opinion of the NCO or officer in charge, the activity is intense enough to warrant detaining of suspects. At this time the commander of troops on the spot radios the next higher headquarters for support and further guidance. Police may be called in (if they are not deployed with the marching or patrolling unit). Meantime, using minimum necessary force, the troop commander detains the individuals. He avoids the actual use of the bayonet, and under no circumstances allows the men under his command to fire unless (1) they are fired on, and (2) the location of the hostile fire can be pinpointed. Automatic fire is never used.

Propaganda pamphlets are immediately sent back to headquarters. Extra copies may be read for their amusement value.

Operational Communications

The company deploys to areas of civil disorder with its organic communications equipment. The RC-292 antenna may be required for use by company headquarters should interference from power lines make communications with headquarters difficult.

There are two very basic requirements which must be fulfilled. First, every patrol must have completely reliable communications with the company CP; second, the company must have completely reliable communications with higher headquarters and local police. To accomplish this, the company commander must locate his CP near local telephone facilities. Since Army radios do not net with police radios, company headquarters must have access to civil telephone communications. As a corollary, the company headquarters must remain in continual communication with the CO when he leaves the CP for any reason.

As always, patrol RTOs must keep careful tabulation on the number of hours their batteries have been used and replace them at the first sign of weakening strengths.

Procedures

Communications checks between all elements in contact with one another (patrol-company; fire-team to fire-team, etc.) are made every half-hour. Immediate measures are initiated to restore contact should it be lost.

Normal security procedures are followed. The scene of civil disorder is regarded as "the field," and the company's deployment is fully tactical. Any known "enemy" jamming or other interference should cause an immediate change to the alternate frequency. RTOs are informed before going out on patrol of the code-word for change to an alternate frequency.

Signal Operating Instructions do not go "forward" of the company CP.

Maximum utilization of code-words for important or frequently sent messages is strongly encouraged.

As in combat, leaders do not habitually walk along beside their RTOs. This can be a deadly tip-off to an alert sniper.

If, for any reason, a patrol should become engaged in an anti-sniper operation or any operation of similar seriousness, and if it finds itself unable to communicate with the company CP or police, local pay-telephone booths should be used to regain contact. (Note: leaving the door of the booth ajar will keep its light off.) Failing this, a runner is sent immediately to the CP.

MAPS OF CITY AND AREA OF OPERATIONS

An essential requirement exists for up-to-date city maps covering the AOR and SOR for all companies/batteries committed to any civil disturbance operation. These maps can be the courtesy commercial hand-out type or a map prepared by Chambers of Commerce or other source. It is important, however, that these maps be obtained in sufficient quantity to issue down to squad level and that all maps that are issued contain complete coverage and indicate public buildings, etc.

The map requirement and coverage for the Battalion and higher headquarters operating in the AOR must be of the expanded type and indicate critical and sensitive public and private utility locations which may require special security measures. City planning maps are ideal for the Battalion and higher headquarters to use in planning and controlling operations in a metropolitan area. It is important that all intelligence sections (S-2s) (G-2s) obtain in advance the necessary maps of target cities assigned their commands so that prompt distribution to units can be made prior to (or concurrent with) deployment.

ACCEPTANCE OF GIFTS FROM CIVILIANS

The overwhelming majority of civilians in areas of civil disorder will welcome the deployment of troops to restore order. Many civilians will try to show their gratitude by offering various gifts to soldiers.

As a general guideline, soldiers in the streets should refer such offers to the company CP. Gifts of food, soft drinks, dairy products, magazines, newspapers, paperback books, stationery and cigarettes may be accepted at the company CP where they will be centralized and redistributed equitably. Gifts other than those listed, and their like, will not normally be accepted unless permission is specifically granted by a higher headquarters. Under no circumstances will soldiers solicit gifts of any sort from civilians. No soldier or headquarters will accept any alcoholic beverage from any source.

There were cases in Detroit of grateful shopkeepers inviting both on-duty and off-duty Guardsmen into their stores to "help themselves." Beyond accepting a soft drink, or some similar token, the soldier should refuse the offer as courteously as possible.

USE OF CHEMICAL AGENTS

Para 7-33, FM 19-15 provides the following guidance in the use of "riot control" agents in periods of civil disorder:

"Riot control agents provide effective methods of dispersing crowds. These agents have many advantages over other types of force. They have an immediate effect on large groups of people without causing permanent harm. When conditions are favorable, riot control agents, properly used, will disperse large crowds without troops having to come in actual contact with rioters."

"Authority to use riot control agents rests with the senior commander/leader present at a specific site if their use is deemed necessary to accomplish the mission."

Situations other than crowd control which may require use of chemical agents:

To clear armed looters from a building. If an order to leave the building fails to bring the desired response, a tear-gas canister may be thrown into the area being looted. This should bring the "desired response" quickly, i.e., the looters will leave the building without loot.

As an anti-sniper agent: The situation will have to dictate whether tear agents are called for. The patrol leader must remember that a sniper can move easily from one room to another. If he has been firing from, say, a fourth or fifth story window, the tear agent will not solve the problem of bringing him to bay. After the anti-sniper team has entered the building (with local police), the decision to use gas will pass to the police themselves. Police have normally a much better knowledge of building interiors, escape routes from buildings, etc., than do soldiers. The patrol leader should abide by their judgment.

To prevent escapes down alleys or enclosed passages: Plain, chemical agents are in this case more "humane" than bullets, but they should be employed if and only if no other means of detaining the suspect are available. Again, if police are working with troops, the patrol leader should abide by the decision of the police (without, of course, placing his patrol under command of the police).

WHEN TO LOCK AND LOAD: WHEN TO FIRE

Subject to certain exceptions the major commander of Guard troops will provide guidance as to the considerations outlined in the chapter heading. It is difficult even to prescribe theoretical policy in advance for the employment of firearms by members of the Guard. The guideline minimum force consistent with the mission is valid, but "minimum force" means different things to different people. And small unit leaders (in some cases individual soldiers) may, in areas of responsibility covered by scattered patrols, have to judge whether or not to fire their own weapons.

The following guidance is therefore subject to modifications by major commanders:

- Guardsmen who are fired on and who can identify the locations of those firing may return aimed, single-shot fire at their targets.
- Guardsmen entering areas known or strongly suspected to contain armed suspects may lock and load.
- Detention of suspects who may be armed calls for a weapon locked and loaded. A loaded weapon is trained on the suspect during the search of his person that follows apprehension.
- When the search is completed, the suspect is detained for turn-over to police authority. After he is disarmed, he is only physically restrained. The "cover" weapon is no longer trained on him.
- A sniper should draw only aimed, single shots from Guardsmen.

USE OF DEADLY FORCE

Each individual will be appraised of the fact that only that degree of force may be used which is necessary to accomplish the lawful purpose. He shall bear in mind that reasonable necessity is the measure of his authority and that the suppression of violence without bloodshed is a worthy military achievement. He shall employ only such force as is necessary to accomplish his mission and will deliver apprehended civilians to civil authorities as soon as possible.

The use of deadly force (i.e., live ammunition or any other type of physical force likely to cause death or serious bodily harm) in effect invokes the power of summary execution and can therefore be justified only by extreme necessity. Accordingly, its use is not authorized for the purpose of preventing activities which do not pose a significant risk of death or serious bodily harm (for example, curfew violations or looting). Use of deadly force is authorized where all three of the following circumstances are present:

1. Lesser means have been exhausted or are unavailable.
2. The risk of death or serious bodily harm to innocent persons is not increased by its use.
3. The purpose of its use is one or more of the following.
 - Self-defense to avoid death or serious bodily harm.
 - Prevention of a crime which involves a substantial risk of death or serious bodily harm (for example, to prevent sniping).
 - Prevention of the destruction of public utilities or similar property vital to public health or safety.

In addition, the following policies in the use of deadly force will be observed.

- When deadly force is used, aim where possible to wound, not to kill.
- In order to avoid firing which creates a hazard to innocent persons and can create the mistaken impression on the part of citizens that sniping is widespread, warning shots will not be employed.
- Where other means have failed and firing is necessary to control sniping, well aimed fire by expert marksmen will be used wherever possible. Such firing will be by carefully aimed shots, directed only at plainly visible firers, so as to minimize injury or damage to persons or property not part of the target.

ARMED, FRIENDLY CIVILIANS

Subject to state and local regulations, law-abiding citizens are authorized to own and carry weapons. In cities where the Guard is deployed to control civil disorders, Guardsmen can expect to find friendly civilians who have armed themselves to protect themselves, their families, and their property.

Such individuals normally pose no problems to law enforcement agencies. However, in periods of limited visibility armed, friendly civilians can be dangerous to Guardsmen. For instance, many residential areas are intersected by alleyways separating backyards, and often lined with trees and shrubbery; and to the civilian "guarding" his house from the back porch, any sound of movement in the back yard is initially a hostile sound. At the same time, shouted warnings by Guardsmen would alert possible suspects who are hiding or escaping in alleyways, side-streets, etc.

This "dilemma" is easily resolved. In deploying into an assigned area of responsibility, the unit leaders should identify, to the extent practicable under the circumstances, those shop-keepers and home-owners who are keeping their weapons ready for use. Normally the assigned area will be too large to make a complete check practicable. The company commander, therefore, designates critical areas (business establishments, alleys, etc) against which vandalism is likely to be directed, or where snipers may hide. If he deploys Guardsmen in stationary locations, he informs friendly civilians in the area where they are to be placed, so that they will not be fired on.

Also, unit leaders should caution civilians having weapons to use care in identifying their targets before firing. Civilians should be urged not to load their weapons unless they intend to use them immediately.

Finally civilians must not be permitted to join in fire-fights between Guardsmen and suspects. Their efforts, however well-intended, can only add to the problem.

CURFEWS AND THEIR ENFORCEMENT

An emergency serious enough to warrant the commitment of Guard troops will usually cause a curfew to be imposed on the city. Its enforcement is vitally important. Guardsmen work with police to insure it is not broken.

Violators of curfews are immediately stopped and questioned as to where they are going. If no exceptions to the rule of curfew has been authorized, all violators are detained and held until local police arrive and turned over to them. Sometimes the local government will allow certain exceptions to curfew, such as working a night shift. If the Guardsman feels that the person detained has an honest reason which authorizes him to be out after curfew, he allows the person to proceed. On the other hand, anyone who does not appear to have a valid excuse to be out on the streets, either as a pedestrian or in a car, is detained and given over to the custody of local police.

Curfews are normally imposed during hours of darkness. For a time after the curfew hour, traffic is often heavy, and Guardsmen located at intersections should not stop each automobile to determine its destination - otherwise serious tie-ups result. When the traffic thins down, cars should be stopped.

No matter what their excuse, pedestrians should not be allowed on the streets and sidewalks during curfew hours. They should either be detained until police arrive for questioning them, or, if the distance is not far, directed to move quickly to their place of business. Their risk should be explained to them; obviously, they do not understand the situation if they are out needlessly on the streets.

Licenses of cars which do not stop at established roadblocks or questioning points are taken down and sent forward to higher headquarters, along with careful descriptions of the cars and their occupants. Mere violation of curfew or an attempt to escape from arrest for curfew violation never justifies the use of firearms to detain such violators.

SUPPORT OF FIRE DEPARTMENTS

One of the new aspects of civil disturbances is the widespread arson that now occurs in a metropolitan area that is the scene of riots or disorder.

Characteristics of this aspect of the new type riots are:

Firebomb attack of fire apparatus by hard core rioters.

Sniper fire against firemen fighting a fire.

Chopping or puncturing fire hoses.

Opening fire hydrants simultaneously throughout a neighborhood

to lower fire hose water pressures.

False alarms to outlying areas - while arsonists attack other objectives.

Brief studies of patterns of arson attack reveal:

Most frequent arson attacks occur against neighborhood stores

that do large charge account business within the community.

Supermarkets or shopping centers where looting can occur under cover of arson.

Businesses or homes where the occupant is the subject of a neighborhood grudge.

It is essential that the AOR commander consider ways available to him to support the work of fire departments operating in his AOR.

Protective support to fire fighters may take the form of providing:

Armed riding guards to accompany fire apparatus and provide anti-sniper protection in the fire area.

Hose guards to prevent destruction or damage to hoses and to prevent unauthorized persons from turning off fire hydrants.

Manning road blocks to divert traffic and sightseers from the area.

SECURITY FOR FIRE STATIONS AND FIRE EQUIPMENT PARKS

The company/battery commander that is assigned a sector of responsibility (SOR) may be required to provide perimeter protection to fire stations and fire equipment parks. This can best be done by consulting with local fire station chief as to his security plan and being prepared to provide:

Perimeter stationary sentry posts covering avenues of approach to the fire station or equipment park.

Discouraging loitering or crowds gathering near the fire station exits.

Rehearse riding guards as to their positions on fire apparatus and on their duties in the fire area.

Normally, the actual fighting of fires is best left to the trained and experienced fire fighters. Reinforcement as hose-handlers or other simple tasks can be given Guardsmen when it is necessary to expand the available experienced firefighter manpower.

WITHDRAWAL FROM AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

When order has been re-established in the operational area, the major commander of troops will provide guidance for the withdrawal of Guard units from their areas of responsibility. The withdrawal will be accomplished gradually and the initial redeployment will most likely be to a site near the operational area.

Even before preliminary withdrawal guidance is issued, the company commander and his subordinates may be able to gauge a gradual improvement in their AOR. The number of on-duty patrols diminishes, though the mobile reserve remains on alert. The company commander may direct regular training classes be held for off-duty personnel; PT is held in the mornings, and, if space is available, athletics provide a good diversion for the troops.

An effective withdrawal is characterized by close liaison with the local police. Liaison is carried on down to the lowest practical levels.

Upon receipt of the withdrawal order, patrol/squad leaders should compile lists of items lost by troops; these lists should be sent to the company CP early enough to allow a careful search of the area before the company pulls out. In addition, a careful police call is held in all areas occupied by the company's elements. Where possible, patrol leaders, platoon leaders, and the company commander thank civilians who have been particularly helpful during the period of our operations in their neighborhoods.

An exit survey for possible damage should be conducted upon withdrawal from buildings used by the Guard. In the absence of engineer assistance, unit officers should conduct a survey and record the results for future reference in the event of damage claims.

INTELLIGENCE

General

Control of civil disorder requires adequate intelligence data at all levels. Individual Guardsmen and small-unit leaders must constantly look for useful information and "indicators" within their assigned sectors of responsibility. Plans are based on intelligence – and a company control plan, for example, is largely based on the information the company commander has received about his AOR. Normally the reduced "hostile" activities of daylight hours free junior leaders to move through their sectors, looking for critical areas, likely places for concealment of snipers, and potential targets for snipers and looters. Civilians, particularly those who own small businesses in the area, should be questioned about previous lawless acts that have occurred near their places of business. They should be encouraged to report hostile phone calls, threats, and all acts of looting, vandalism, sniping, as well as rumors of plans for similar acts. "Tips" from civilians may indicate serious danger to stores and houses. In such cases small-unit leaders may recommend positioning of Guards to guard against the possibility, although troop commitments to specific locations should be minimized. The individual soldier must report to his immediate superior any information which may have any possible value to the commander in his planning. As in combat, troops should use the key word "S A L U T E" (Size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment) in reporting information. Each patrol must be debriefed by the patrol leader at its conclusion. He in turn reports to the CP and presents his findings to the company commander or platoon leader, where they are noted in the intelligence journal.

Likewise, relevant intelligence is disseminated down to lowest levels during patrol briefings, e.g. intelligence about suspected cars moving across several sectors of responsibility.

The Recorder

Control of civil disorder has, as shown above, a continuing need for up-to-date intelligence data. To insure its benefits be used, it must be written down by a Guardsman appointed as a recorder. Each patrol (or squad-size element) is assigned a recorder from the patrol or from company headquarters. The recorder stays with the patrol leader and records in detail all actions of the patrol and information of possible intelligence value. He includes as much detail as time permits, and

re-checks his record at the conclusion of the patrol. It is then used by the patrol leader in his report to the unit commander and turned in to the company recorder (a clerk) who keeps an accurate and up-to-date journal of the company's activities. Collected records of unit activities may later be used for:

- Their intelligence value.
- To set the record straight in the face of inaccurate or slanted reporting.
- To improve future operations.

Reports

In addition to written reports of intelligence data and small-unit activities, patrols report by radio to company headquarters as often as the company commander may direct, but never less frequently than once each hour, and always at the first indication of disorder. Regular reports may vary from a brief "situation negative" to a fairly detailed accounting of the patrol's activities during its last hour (excluding, of course, any information which would compromise the unit's plan if unfriendly elements were monitoring the net). In general, the company commander directs what radio reports should include. He in turn forwards hourly "SITREPS" (situation reports) to higher headquarters.

Detention of Suspects; Tagging of Weapons and Alleged Stolen Objects; Women Prisoners

Higher headquarters will furnish guidance for the detention of individuals by Guard troops. In the absence of police forces, however, the patrolling unit may have to detain individuals (those, for instance, caught in the act of looting or vandalism). Though more explicit guidance will be given by the commander of troops in the city, the general rule is that troops do not fire at suspects who attempt to escape, though they may load their weapons as a precaution. Wherever possible, troops surround the suspect, and if necessary, use minimum physical force to restrain him. He should never be threatened with a weapon: This will prevent the soldier's "bluff" being called by an individual foolish enough (or shrewd enough!) to attempt escape with a weapon trained on him.

In the meantime, a radio report is immediately sent to the CP, and police are called in.

The detainee is immediately searched by the police. Concealed weapons and loot are taken from him and tagged and turned over to the police.

Women will not be searched under any circumstances, and will be physically restrained only as a last resort, to prevent their escape. There are several reasons for this, one being that women suspects, when captured, tend to become martyrs to other lawless elements; it is also obvious what the repercussions of any physical contact between troops and women could be when embellished by hostile witnesses.

A written report giving a detailed description of the circumstances under which each detention occurs will be made at the earliest practical time after detention. Statements from at least two witnesses should be obtained when possible.

SUMMARY

Remember the mission:

Stop violence — prevent bloodshed.

Protect private and public property.

Restore law and order.

The accomplishment of this mission with minimum casualties to civilians and Guardsmen is a most worthwhile military objective.

THE NATIONAL GUARD AS A FEDERAL FORCE DURING CIVIL DISORDER

The primary State mission of the National Guard is to provide the State governor with organized, trained and equipped military manpower to protect life and property and to preserve peace and order and to provide for the public safety of all citizens.

Should the rare occasion occur, when the Arizona National Guard is placed in active Federal service to suppress civil disorder in Arizona or another State, these special orders will apply for individual Guardsmen while they are in Federal status:

SPECIAL ORDERS FOR ALL MILITARY PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN CIVIL DISTURBANCE OPERATIONS

1. Carry out your assigned duties in a military manner and present a neat military appearance at all times. Be sure that everything you do reflects credit upon your country, the military service, your unit, and yourself.
2. Have regard for the human rights of all persons. Be as courteous toward civilians as possible under the circumstances. Do not mistreat anyone or withhold medical attention from anyone needing it. Do not damage property unnecessarily.
3. Use only the minimum amount of force required to accomplish your mission and, if necessary, to defend yourself. When under the control of an officer, you will load or fire your weapon only on his orders. When not under the control of an officer, you will load or fire your weapon only when required to protect your own life or the lives of others, to protect specified property designated as vital to public health or safety, or to prevent the escape of persons endangering life or vital facilities; you are not authorized to use firearms to prevent offenses which are not likely to cause death or serious bodily harm, nor endanger public health or safety.
4. When firing is necessary, shoot to wound, not to kill.
5. When possible, let civilian police arrest lawbreakers. But when assistance is necessary or in the absence of the civil police, you have the duty and the authority to take lawbreakers into custody. Take such persons to the police or designated military authorities as soon as possible. Cooperate fully with the police by safeguarding evidence and completing records as instructed.
6. Allow properly identified news reporters freedom of movement, so long as they do not interfere with the mission of your unit.
7. Do not talk about this operation or pass on information or rumors about it to unauthorized persons; refer all civilians who ask for information about what you are doing to your commanding officer.
8. Become familiar with these special orders, and carry a copy of them on your person at all times when engaged in civil disturbance operations.

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